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BUDGETARY
CONTROL IN A
MANUFACTURING
PLANT:
THE PROBLEMS AND PLANS FOR
IMPROVEMENT
AN EXTENDED CASE STUDY
Michael A. Novak

The Situation
The case involves a relatively in
dependent subsidiary of a large na
tional corporation. The subsidiary,
herein referred to as MANU, employs
a total work force of just under 500
people. It is basically a small order
job shop, producing sophisticated,
miniature motors, requiring skilled
engineering and machining. The
subsidiary had been a family owned
and operated company for 20 years,
having been bought out by the cor
poration in 1967. Most of the
employees have been with the com
pany over 15 years. Most persons in
managerial positions have come up
through the ranks.
The author was called in as a con
sultant to design and conduct a
management training program for
the lower level managers (man
agers, supervisors and foremen),
most of whom had little or no formal
managerial education. The author
agreed to enter the system not under
the above contract but rather to do
an analysis of the entire manage
ment system and to offer action
recommendations — one of which
might well be a management train
ing program.
During the course of forty in
dividual interviews and five small
group sessions, six major issues sur
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faced, one of which was referred to
as “scorekeeping” — the process for
monitoring a unit’s productivity and
efficiency. The interviews and group
sessions included all management
levels. On the issue of scorekeeping,
basically two differing viewpoints
emerged, one being held by the plant
manager and his staff while the other
was held by middle and lower level
managers.

A summary statement agreed
on by these lower-level man
agers was that the scorekeep
ing system was inaccurate,
unfair and demoralizing.

The lower managers saw the situa
tion as follows: 1) when the monthly
shipping-dollar goal is met, no ques
tions are asked, no one seems too
worried about high amounts of over
time, waste or low efficiency; 2)
when the goal is not met, perform
ance and procedures throughout the
system are scrutinized and some
body gets blamed for the failure; 3)
meeting the goal every month seems

at times to be less efficient than
being flexible and meeting goals ev
ery 3 or 4 months — monthly goals
force overtime near the end of the
month and create slack time during
the first week of the following month
— some orders for the month fall
through, thereby necessitating some
orders in the following month to be
moved up; 4) “dollars-shipped”
seems to be an unfair and over
simplified unit of account for assess
ing each department’s efficiency and
productivity — for example, one
department loses “A labor,” which is
produced hours, when it has to do
“rework” caused by some other
department’s error; 5) routine, in
dividual performance appraisal is
basically negative — records are
kept only of failures and not for what
is done well or over and above what
is required; recognition and positive
reinforcement in the form of a bonus
usually occur only at the end of the
year and are usually uniform across
each level; 6) when a target date is
missed anywhere along the line, no
one is really accountable — it’s al
ways the other guy’s fault. A summ
ary statement agreed on by these
managers was that the scorekeeping
system was inaccurate, unfair and
demoralizing.
From top management’s point of
view: 1) the scorekeeping system is
not oversimplified but considers
yield, efficiency and produced
hours; 2) the system is fair and accu
rate with realistic and flexible limits
on yield, efficiency, produced hours,
rework, scrap, overtime, etc. — all to
be brought in line under total cost; 3)
the lower level managers take too
simplified of an approach to solving
their problems and only consider
one dimension at a time, such as
overtime, produced hours or efficien
cy; 4) these managers do not seem to
be committed to “getting the job
done” or “taking ownership for the
dollars-to-be-shipped” but rather are
concerned about “playing it safe
and worry only about their narrow
job, not its impact on others.”
There seems to be two basic ques
tions. Is the unit of account over
simplified or the application of it? Is
there a lack of ownership on the part
of some managers or is there
nothing to own?1 There are several
additional related but subsidiary
issues which will be discussed in
terms of the above two.

The accounting system had
data on accomplishments but
the management system only
focused on the failures

Analysis
In analyzing the above, the author
identified a) the violation of several
management accounting principles
and b) the formation of dysfunctional
interpersonal behavior cycles which
seemed to explain the problems and
point to possible solutions.
The types of accounting informa
tion that Simon identified as necess
ary in order for a manager to answer
three basic managerial questions
[Simon, 1957, p. 20] — were either
not provided adequately by the ac
counting system or, if provided, were
not being used. The three questions
Simon posed are: 1) “Am I doing well
or badly?” (a performance appraisal
focus), 2) “What problems should I
look into?” (an attention-directing
focus), and 3) “Of the several ways of
doing the job, which is the best?” (a
problem solving focus).
At all managerial levels in MANU,
there was agreement that question
No. 1 was handled only partially and
that part was “failure feedback.” At
staff meetings, failures were zeroed
in on while accomplishments were
taken for granted. The accounting
system had data on accomplish
ments but the management system
only focused on the failures. This at
titude was very strong in the plant
manager and, not surprisingly, was
transmitted down through all man
agerial levels.
With regard to question No. 2, the
plant manager focused only on
negative results such as too much
overtime or too few productive
hours. Moreover, his focus was on
outcomes and not their causes. His
manner of verbalizing “what the
problem is” and, therefore, where at
tention should be directed was per

ceived by his mangerial team as nar data available for attention-directing
row and over simplified. Some mem and problem solving. He was the one
bers of the team explained that his person other than the chief accoun
meaning and intent was broader and tant who had the clearest under
more complete than his words. Upon standing of how most of the dimen
further questioning, these same peo sions interacted (which probably ex
ple acknowledged that he rarely if plains why he was given the Prod
ever verbalized his full intent. A typi uction head job). He expected his
cal declaration of the plant manager managers to be able to manage in a
after a month of high overtime was similar fashion. His expectations
“no overtime this month.” Some of were highly inappropriate since 1)
his managers took him literally and there was no accountant directly
some figuratively. The effect seemed responsible for these management
to be confusion, anger and protec accounting functions to advise the
tive entrenchment by the lower man managers, 2) his managers had no
agers in response to such perceived previous education or training in
overreaction.
how to conceptualize issues in these
Regarding question no. 3, problem terms and 3) the present top man
solving for the best solutions, the ac agerial practice (noted above) ex
counting system provided informa emplified a simplistic, unidimen
tion on all the dimensions (produced sional use of accounting data.
hours, etc.) but not in a related or in
Norms for the Selection of Ac
tergrated way in which probable
counting
Practices
consequences could be calculated
In light of Simon’s three functions,
by production managers or super
visors. The information was not man Horngren presents five guides or
ageably or relevantly packaged. norms for the selection of manage
Most managers only considered one ment accounting practices [Anton
or two dimensions and never tried to and Firmin, 1972]. These norms will
look at the total interactive effect of be used as an outline for the remain
all the dimensions in solving prob ing analysis of the case in point.
lems. Only two high level managers
Horngren takes as his starting
seemed able and interested in an in point the concept of relevancy. He
tegration of all the dimensions. The defines relevant broadly as that data
chief accountant was one. While he which will lead to an optimum deci
could discuss the integration, he sion [Anton/Firmin, p. 6]. He dis
acknowledged at a group session tinguishes relevancy (that which is
that he was not sure how to weight valid and pertinent) from accuracy
the various dimensions to minimize (precision). Figures can be precise
total cost for a specific problematic but irrelevant, imprecise yet relevant.
situation. It must be recalled that the A key part of relevancy is timeliness.
job shop nature of the plant is not Highly accurate but stale data are ir
characterized by firm long-range relevant because they have no bear
planning, the scheduling of large or ing on the decisions facing the reci
ders, or by a stable recurring product pient. Recalling the job shop
base. Small orders and short lead- character of the case in point, the
time orders requiring highly relevant data available is usually im
specialized parts, engineering and precise. Yet, there is neither time nor
machining militate against any opportunity to figure ahead of time
useful calculation of probable con what information will be needed in
sequences of decisions. There are order to improve the accuracy since
few constants and many critical there is so little regularity in the
system.
variables.
The first norm: Focus the basic
Contrary to Simon’s recommenda
tion, the three distinct management design of the accounting system
accounting functions of perform upon the responsibility centers of in
ance appraisal, attention-directing dividual managers. Ideally, particu
and problem solving were not man lar revenues and costs would be
ned by separate full-time accoun recorded and automatically traced
tants. However, the head of prod to the one individual responsible for
uction (who was new to this position the item (Anton/Firmin, p. 8).
but not new in the company) ex Horngren’s practical conclusion that
pected his managerial subordinates the diffusion of control throughout
to know how to use the accounting the organization complicates the
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task of collecting relevant data by
responsibility centers seems true in
this case. The work flow, com
munication flow, and decision flow
are each complex, due to high inter
dependence among departments
and work units caused by high situa
tional variability.
In a group session with managers
and the chief accountant, the follow
ing situation came to light. The com
pany has been divided into cost cen
ters, each responsible for submitting
a budget. Top management has
reviewed and revised them accord
ing to goals and constraints. The
revised budgets have not normally
been communicated back down to
the cost centers — a management
rather than an accounting break
down. Further, cost centers have
been able to overspend without
departmental control. Due to omis
sion rather than plan, control has
been left to the chief accountant who
cleared requests until the money ran
out and then rejected all requests.
One result has been that conscien
tious people who waited and
carefully planned their budgets
usually found there was nothing left
when they submitted their request.
The impact on the lower managers
in charge of cost centers has been
cynicism and disbelief when they
have been told to take ownership
and take charge of their cost cen
ters. They do not perceive them
selves as having real control or as
having been treated as “people in
charge.” Responsibility has not
really been delegated. The words
have been said but the actions have
not been taken by top management.
Horngren’s second norm: Study
and delineate individual managers’
needs in relation to their sphere of
responsibility and the objectives of
the organization as a whole [Anton/Firmin, p. 9]. This norm main
tains that the management accoun
tant must evaluate the influence of
the accounting system on the
motivations of individuals. As dis
cussed earlier, the misuse of the ac
counting system by focusing only on
failures and sending down one
dimensional messages, “No over
time,” was perceived by lower man
agers as threatening and over
simplified. They saw that no over
time, meant to save money, could
wind up costing the company
money. Blanket, unqualified
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messages made the accounting
system appear impractical, unfair
and creating more and more bur
dens for the managers. Managers’
needs for help — information and
training — to keep overtime down,
produced hours up, yield up and effi
ciency up were not met by one
dimensional statements. Again top
management lost credibility.
That lower managers would “pro
tect” themselves and their work units
in order to look good on perform
ance reports even to the detriment of
the company as a whole is under
standable in light of the above. They
perceived that no assistance was
coming to help them avoid less than
optimal decisions, yet such mistakes
were not totally their fault. Since
blaming and head-hunting would
follow failure, survival meant pro
tecting oneself, making sure blame
fell somewhere else. Getting the job
done followed only after one was
protected.
Top management was aware of
the above “protecting” “ducking”
and “not getting the job done.” They
were not aware that the messages
they were sending down gave good
cause for such behavior.
Horngren’s third norm: Scorekeep
ing data should be accurate. This
has not been possible for each work
unit since no feasible system has
been found to track the quality of the
job done as work passes from one
unit to the next. What is found to be
intolerable to specifications might
be due to machine error, vendor er
ror, or engineering error. Moreover,
as deadlines draw near, tolerances
loosen up and what passes now
would not have passed yesterday.
In some areas scrap has been
reduced. Much of that reduction is
believed attributable to a tighter re
porting system. In effect, much of the
previously reported scrap might well
have existed only on paper.
Horngren’s fourth norm: Budgets
or standards should be understood
and accepted as reasonably attaina
ble goals [Anton/Firmin, p. 12]. The
previously recounted budgeting
practice points out that through the
lack of downward communication
the budget was not understood and,
through the lack of departmental
control or cost center control, was
not accepted. To paraphrase many
supervisors, “the budget is a farce.”
Similarly, standards or policies deal

Close, direct, active contacts
between accountants and
operating managers appears
to be non-existent.

ing with overtime, produced hours,
etc. also have made little sense and
have gained little acceptance by
lower managers, due primarily to the
manner in which they have been pre
sented. The close, direct, active con
tacts between accountants and
operating managers necessary to
strengthen understanding and ac
ceptability of standards, budgets
and reports as measuring devices of
performance [Simon, 1957] appears
to be non-existent at MANU below
the top management level.
Instead of ducking, entrenching,
blaming or doing nothing about the
scorekeeping system, the production
engineer exercised some responsi
ble initiative in submitting a pro
posal to the previous head and also
to the present head of Production.
However, he never received a
response to the proposal.
Horngren’s fifth norm: The items
used to judge performance must be
controllable by the recipient. The
high interdependency among
departments and units at MANU mili
tate against controllability of items.
For example, a shipping foreman
must manage overtime and yield.
However, even it the foreman
decides to work overtime for the
sake of needed yield, twelve sig
natures are required to proceed as
decided. Some of those signatures
come from foremen of other depart
ments such as quality control and
maintenance who have to be willing
to work overtime with shipping. If
they find that they cannot possibly
handle more overtime, they may
refuse to sign. The shipping foreman
then must go up a few levels to
secure more leverage to get the
needed signatures. If the shipping
foreman wins, the quality control
foreman loses control of his/her
overtime and vice-versa.

Once again, top management has
expressed the expectation that the
foreman’s job is to manage such
matters and take control of items
such as overtime, conflicts notwith
standing. From the foremen’s point
of view, they wind up fighting the
whole system and possibly messing
up fellow foremen while controlling
their own times.

Budgetary Control Revisions:
A New Plan
The above analysis was presented
to, discussed with and challenged by
the new (present) head of Production
four months after he assumed the
new position. He eventually ac
cepted most of the analysis.
Two months later, after much con
sultation, the new chief accountant
presented the following budgeting
and budgetary control process for
variable expenses.
1. Primary budgetary control is to
be decentralized to cost centers.
Each center is to track its commit
ments in terms of “when committed”
rather than “when received.” In
order for “tracking via commit
ments” to be useful accounting in
formation to managers, each requis
tion must have as accurate a cost
estimate as possible. If cost estimat
ing assistance is needed, managers
are expected (and will be held ac
countable) for seeking assistance
and suggestions from the Purchas
ing Agent or the Industrial Buying
Center. This is a new norm for the
system.
2. If a cost center manager needs
to exceed his budget, he is to go up
one level to see if he can “borrow”
money for that month from another
unit within his boss’ division or
department. If there is no money at
that level, with the help of his boss
he is to go up another level and so
on, all the way to the plant manager
— a form of flexible budgeting.
3. If a center manager does not
spend his quota for the month, it can
be accrued for the remainder of the
quarter. In the past, each center went
back to zero.
4. Continuing to reinforce flex
ibility and cost center responsibility,
the new plan states that a manager
can choose to spend his budget
differently from the initial budget
breakdown.
5. Should someone else want a
part of a given manager’s budget,

that manager must be consulted. If
he chooses not to release some of
his funds but is overruled by his
boss, he will receive a formal notice
of his new budget to protect him dur
ing a future performance evaluation.
Further, no one has a right to sign
requistion charged to someone else
— another new norm.
6. If the total division budget (e.g.
for Production) begins to be ex
ceeded, a given manager may be cut
back even if he has been in line.
Again, formal notice will be given on
budget cutbacks and the revised
priorities which justify the cutback
and protect that manager. Also,
Production has the flexibility to
“buy” overtime dollars by giving up
other variable expense dollars.
7. The new system also attempts to
clarify and break-out “uncontrolla
bles.” Managers are to take special
care to eliminate from their budget
print-out items which they do not
control such as depreciation. Man
agers will be held responsible for
those items that they and Account
ing finally agree are under their con
trol. This practice is in close agree
ment with Bentley’s position on the
question of who controls costs and,
therefore, where responsibility
should be placed. Bentley [1978, p.
195] writes:
In every company with which I
have been involved, depreciation
is charged to the activity using the
equipment. This is done on the
concept that depreciation is the
cost of using the equipment. This
is not so; depreciation is a finan
cial charge against profits aimed
at recovering the original cost of
the item not previously charged
against profits and will need to be
charged whether or not the asset
is used. The local activity manager
rarely has any say in the financing
of capital purchases, yet he is
charged depreciation, an item
over which he has no control. If he
hired the equipment he would only
need to pay when he used it but he
rarely has the opportunity of
choosing whether to hire or buy.
In the remainder of his article,
Bentley presents the budgetary con
trol process as being established in
reverse of the way it has traditionally
been established. He begins by ask
ing “At what level are managers
going to be held accountable for
costs?” The answer will then deter-

The attention upper-level man
agement gave to the com
plaints and suggestions of
lower-level managers resulted
in the new budgetary control
system.

mine the company’s organization
structure, the individual respon
sibilities of managers, the form and
detail of the accounting system, the
frequency and timing of data collec
tion and the form of the control re
porting system.
The attention upper level manage
ment and specifically the new head
of Production gave to the complaints
and suggestions of lower level man
agers resulted in the new budgetary
control system, evidencing great
sensitivity to the role and needs of
cost center managers. The new
system begins with the question at
what level are managers going to be
held accountable for costs and
builds the rest of the system accord
ing to the answer.
Unfortunately, since the system is
new, there is no evidence as to
whether or not the system works.
However, on paper the new system
attempts to employ many of the cur
rent norms for management ac
counting, and has been received
with great enthusiasm and relief by
the managers. It remains to be seen
whether both upper and lower man
agement use the new system or
revert to previous patterns.
Gifford-Gifford and James [1976]
have devised a schematic, diagram
for use by accountants and others
concerned with effective manage
ment accounting. The schematic
contains the basic points to be con
sidered (or actions to be taken) for
providing management with the rele
vant accounting information it
needs. This schematic has been of
service to MANU in terms of monitor
ing Accounting and Production per
formance in implementing the new
system (See Exhibit 1)
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Diagram A.

Consider agreed strategies
and programs. Analyze
present procedures, noting
interrelationships.
Understand behavioral
aspects of the organization —
particularly the objectives
of individuals.

Determine the decisions
which are needed.

Learn managers’
information requirements

Appreciate corporate and
industry ethos.

Design a report to meet
these.

Note constraints and
potential problem areas;
and dependent information
systems.

Give an interpretation
on data collected.

Communicate and get
feedback on usefulness
of report from managers.

From feedback, monitor
success of information
system in achieving
corporate and individual
objectives.

Note
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